Posts Tagged ‘Ethics’

Hoops, Paydays, and Epistemology

Sunday, April 12th, 2009

 Cross-posted at Philosophy on the Mesa.

The excessive risk-taking by banks and investment firms that caused the economic meltdown was in part the result of the skewed incentive structure of their compensation packages. Because their compensation was based on how well their company’s stock did over the relatively short term, they had every incentive to take on excessive, long-term risk if it would boost their short-term profits.

What was bad for the health of the firm was good for the stock trader or manager who pocketed immediate benefits.

NPR’s Scott Horsley, referencing a recent NY Times article by Michael Lewis on NBA star Michael Battier, compared Wall Street’s approach to compensation to compensation based on individual statistics in the NBA. Players often take poor shots in order to pad their stats, even though passing the ball would be better for the team, and many players virtually ignore defense, an essential part of the game, because it is more difficult to represent in statistical measures. If a player’s compensation is dependent on individual statistics only, they are rewarded for actions that often hurt the team.

These skewed incentives indicate a disturbing trend in contemporary society. We tend to form beliefs around data that is pervasive only because it is easy to acquire. It is easy to count and assign individual responsibility for baskets or sales minus expenses. These are convenient ways of keeping score.

However, the fact that a bit of data is easy to gather does not mean that it is providing a comprehensive, accurate measure of the health of the firm (or a basketball team). Stuff that isn’t easy to measure is not part of the calculation.

So why do hard-working, serious people take the easy way out when trying to measure performance? Isn’t it obvious to management (whether in sports or business) that the way the measure performance can be incomplete?

In a recent post, I argued that our economic problems were the result of an epistemological crisis. Our Wall St. wizards created lots of investment vehicles they didn’t understand and could not analyze.

But this tendency to form beliefs and hence policies around easily accessible data suggests another epistemological dimension to this crisis that explains why we take the easy way out.

Jerry Z. Muller writes:

From the point of view of top management, the diversity of operations means that executives were managing assets and services with which they have little familiarity. This has led to the spread of pseudo-objectivity: the search for standardized measures of achievement across large and disparate organizations. Its implicit premises were these: that information which is numerically measurable is the only sort of knowledge necessary; that numerical data can substitute for other forms of inquiry; and that numerical acumen can substitute for practical knowledge about the underlying assets and services. A good deal of our current economic travails can be traced to this increasing valuation of purportedly objective criteria, so denoted because they can be expressed and manipulated in mathematical form by people who may be skilled at such manipulation but who lack “concrete” knowledge or experience of the things being made or traded.

This is a theme that I emphasize in Reviving the Left. The pursuit of objectivity, and the resulting abstract representations, often leave out crucial data we need in order to act well, especially where human beings are concerned. Sensitive, situational knowledge that sometimes involves feelings and intuition is essential for guiding human action, but it is not well represented by mathematical models. Yet the “cult of accountability” is fast spreading throughout society. From finance and basketball to education and health care, every activity is being measured by a metric that may not capture crucial components of the activity—with sometimes disastrous consequences.

Bigot

Wednesday, April 1st, 2009

Via Hilzoy, conservative writer Rod Dreher made the following statement regarding gay marriage:

If homosexuality is legitimized — as distinct from being tolerated, which I generally support — then it represents the culmination of the sexual revolution, the goal of which was to make individual desire the sole legitimate arbiter in defining sexual truth. It is to lock in, and, on a legal front, to codify, a purely contractual, nihilistic view of human sexuality. I believe this would be a profound distortion of what it means to be fully human. And I fully expect to lose this argument in the main, because even most conservatives today don’t fully grasp how the logic of what we’ve already conceded as a result of being modern leads to this end.

Let’s break down this argument. Dreher seems to be asserting:

1) The goal of the sexual revolution was to make individual desire the sole criterion for ethically legitimate sexuality.

2) Thus, that both parties want to engage in sex is sufficient reason to engage in it.

3) This view utterly devalues genuine sexuality.

4) Allowing gays to marry codifies this debased view of sexuality

5) Thus, we should not allow gays to marry.

The problems with this argument abound. (1) is false. The goal of the sexual revolution was to make individual desire a permissible reason to have sex. But that does not preclude the expression of deep, abiding, committed love as a better reason. Thus, individual desire is not the sole criterion. Thus, there is no reason to think (3) is true. Furthermore, why would the practice of consensual sex entail that we could no longer make value judgments about inappropriate or harmful sexual contact?

But let’s ignore that “argument” for a moment.

Premise (4) asserts that the only reason gay people have for wanting to marry is a desire for a debased form of sex. The obvious implication is that gay folks are incapable of deep, abiding love. Gay people are thus allegedly incapable of a common, nearly universal human emotion.

To assert such a thing without evidence is pure bigotry.

The Road To Imperial Ruin

Tuesday, March 31st, 2009

Cross-posted at Philosophy on the Mesa.

One of the main themes of Reviving the Left is that the ethics of care is relevant in the political arena in areas such as foreign policy.

Unlike moral theories that strive for universality, and thus focus on what human beings have in common, the ethics of care rests prescriptions on knowledge of particular persons, their circumstances, and their differences, and the cultivation of empathy and perceptiveness to gain such knowledge.

Matt Yglesias makes a point about our approach to Pakistan that implicitly reinforces the importance of an ethic of care.

In responding to the argument that we may not be able to trust the Pakistanis to root out the Taliban and Al-Quaeda from tribal areas he writes:

“This sort of thing is, in my view, really the achilles heel of the American imperial project….And when we get involved in things like the internal politics of Pakistan, or political reform in Egypt, or wars in the Horn of Africa, and so forth we’re dealing in situations where the level of understanding is incredibly asymmetric. If you go to pretty much any country in the world, you’ll find that educated people there know more about the United States than you do about their country. Nobody at highest levels of the American government speaks Urdu. Or Arabic. Or Amharic or Somali or Pashto or Tajik.

Lots of people at high levels in the Pakistani government speak English….they have a vast bounty of media outlets to peruse to gather intelligence. And year-in and year-out Pakistan cares about the same smallish set of countries—Pakistani officials are always focused on issue in their region and issues with the United States. Our officials dance around—the Balkans are important this decade, Central Asia the next, Russia and the Persian Gulf flit on and off the radar, sometimes we notice what’s happening in Mexico, etc.

In other words, in a straightforward contest of power between the United States and Pakistan, we can of course win. But in a scenario where we are trying to manipulate the situation in Pakistan in such-and-such a way and Pakistani actors are trying to manipulate the situation for their own ends, the odds of us actually outwitting the Pakistanis are terrible. They’re in a much better position to manipulate us than we are them.

This is one reason why so many of our foreign policy and foreign aid initiatives go wrong. We assume that other people are like us. We assume they share our interests, habits of communication, and ways of looking at the world because we assume our way is simply the human way.

And these assumptions are encouraged by our dominant moral theories (e.g. Kantian or utilitarian theories) that enjoin us to act only on prescriptions on which it would be rational for anyone to act. Our moral reflection tends to take place on a very general and very generic level.