The recent violence in Iraq is not unexpected. The so-called “surge”—the increase in troop strength that was supposed to provide sufficient security to enable political reconciliation in Iraq—reduced violence but did not produce political reconciliation. Thus the violence is resuming.
But, as Nir Rosen, one of the more reliable commentators on Iraq, writes, this violence is unlikely to result in a return to civil war:
The occasional al Qa’eda suicide attack can still kill masses of innocent civilians, but it has no strategic impact; in fact it is difficult to understand what motivates such attacks today, since their effect is almost nil. It would be naive to say that Iraq’s future is certain, or even likely, to be a peaceful one, but the war between Sunnis and Shiites is now over.
What has changed in Iraq that will enable this stable, though still violent, future?
What did work to reduce violence in Iraq was good, old-fashioned ethnic cleansing and bribery. Rosen continues:
The cleansing of Sunnis from much of Baghdad deprived Sunni insurgents of sanctuary among the population as they were losing battles with al Qa’eda, the Americans and Shiite militias. The Shiite bloc had numerical superiority, backed by the force of the Iraqi state and its security forces. And so, one by one, groups of Sunni resistance fighters struck ceasefire agreements with the Americans and joined the fight against al Qa’eda and other radical elements. The “surge” of American forces allowed Maliki to strengthen the authority of the state and its security forces, while the establishment of the Awakening groups neutralised anti-government Sunni militias (in some cases simply by paying them salaries not to fight the state). The decline in sectarian violence gave Maliki space to weaken competing Shiite militias, who had been integral to cleansing Sunnis from mixed areas and establishing Shiite dominance but whose presence prevented his fully consolidating control.
Thus, as Rosen suggests, many Sunnis have reconciled themselves to an authoritarian, Shia-led government, which they prefer to continued violence and upheaval. And the Iraqi government has been strengthened enough so that anyone who wants to actively oppose it will have few options.
There is nothing the Awakening groups can do. As guerrillas and insurgents they were only effective when they operated covertly, underground, blending in among a Sunni population that has now mostly been dispersed. Now the former resistance fighters-turned-paid guards are publicly known, and their names, addresses and biometric data are in the hands of American and Iraqi forces. They cannot return to an underground that has been cleared, and they still face the wrath of radical Sunnis who view them as traitors. They have failed to unite and as their stories demonstrate, they are on the run.
Let’s hope Rosen is right.
Tags: ethnic cleansing in Iraq, Iraq War, Nir Rosen, the surge
